legal travel problems/solution 48 foot Coach???

[Big5er]

1 hour ago, Twotoes said:

The law in CA (not sure about other states) is as long as you are legal in your state for equipment you can not be cited .

Care to post a link to that statute? 

[Chad Heiser]

1 hour ago, Twotoes said:

Yes I am a Attorney. I went to Law School at the Univ of San Diego School of Law. I practiced 20 years and was a traffic court Judge for 5 years. The lawin CA (not sure about other states) is as long as you are legal in your state for equipment you can not be cited. . For example, if you ride a motorcycle the law in CA is that thehandlebar can not be more than 6 in above your shoulder. No such law in AZ I believe. But also no helmet law in AZ but you can be cited for not wearing a helmet in CA. It is inconvenient and expensive to remove window tint while just passing through the state but it is not inconvenient or expensive to require one to wear a helmet. I would dismiss your citation for window tint violation on an out of state vehicle. 

I start this with an apology to Submariner for getting so far off topic and I also apologize for such a long post, but I like to learn so here I go (also Big5er's question is the same as mine, but a lot more succinct I guess ).

I will freely admit I am not perfect and I could be wrong, but I have been unable to find anything in the code that prevents me from writing an out of state vehicle for an equipment violation.  As AquaDawg brought up, he was stopped for having tinted windows.  His vehicle was registered in a state that allowed the tint, but he was driving it in California that does not allow the tint.  The officer ultimately did not write him a ticket for the violation.  I see this as the officer using discretion and choosing not to issue an out of state resident a simple "fix it" ticket (or equipment violation ticket).  I most likely wouldn't write such a violation either (and I can't come up with an example of having written such a violation over my 24 year career), but there may be some circumstances where I would if called for.  There are lots of different equipment violations on the books including inoperable lights, inoperable windshield wipers, etc., etc., etc.  An equipment violation could easily be a safety issue that needs to be corrected and just because the vehicle is from out of state, Twotoes is saying I cannot write the violation.  I respect Twotoes experience as an attorney and a traffic judge and I am always willing to learn, so if he can direct me to a code that says I cannot write the violation I will be happy to admit I am wrong (because I cannot find one).  I understand why a judge may dismiss such a violation in the interest of justice to prevent an out of state party from returning to the state for such a minor issue (or to fight such a minor issue).  Just like I understand why an officer may make an enforcement stop for an equipment violation on an out of state vehicle and then use discretion and choose not to write the violation for the same reason.

Here is the the actual vehicle code section for "material obstructing or reducing driver's view" which would include window tint.  The code very specifically states "a person shall not drive any motor vehicle ..."  There is no distinction for out of state vehicles and the code gets very specific on what is exempted from being a violation.

VC§ 26708.     Material Obstructing or Reducing Driver's View
(a)    (1)    A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied upon the windshield or side or rear windows.
(2)    A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows.
(3)    This subdivision applies to a person driving a motor vehicle with the driver’s clear vision through the windshield, or side or rear windows, obstructed by snow or ice.
(b)    This section does not apply to any of the following:
(1)    Rearview mirrors.
(2)    Adjustable nontransparent sunvisors that are mounted forward of the side windows and are not attached to the glass.
(3)    Signs, stickers, or other materials that are displayed in a seven-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield farthest removed from the driver, signs, stickers, or other materials that are displayed in a seven-inch square in the lower corner of the rear window farthest removed from the driver, or signs, stickers, or other materials that are displayed in a five-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield nearest the driver.
(4)    Side windows that are to the rear of the driver.
(5)    Direction, destination, or terminus signs upon a passenger common carrier motor vehicle or a schoolbus, if those signs do not interfere with the driver’s clear view of approaching traffic.
(6)    Rear window wiper motor.
(7)    Rear trunk lid handle or hinges.
(8)    The rear window or windows, if the motor vehicle is equipped with outside mirrors on both the left- and right-hand sides of the vehicle that are so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway through each mirror for a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of the vehicle.
(9)    A clear, transparent lens affixed to the side window opposite the driver on a vehicle greater than 80 inches in width and that occupies an area not exceeding 50 square inches of the lowest corner toward the rear of that window and that provides the driver with a wide-angle view through the lens.
(10)    Sun screening devices meeting the requirements of Section 26708.2 installed on the side windows on either side of the vehicle’s front seat, if the driver or a passenger in the front seat has in his or her possession a letter or other document signed by a licensed physician and surgeon certifying that the person must be shaded from the sun due to a medical condition, or has in his or her possession a letter or other document signed by a licensed optometrist certifying that the person must be shaded from the sun due to a visual condition. The devices authorized by this paragraph shall not be used during darkness.
(11)    An electronic communication device affixed to the center uppermost portion of the interior of a windshield within an area that is not greater than five inches square, if the device provides either of the following:
(A)    The capability for enforcement facilities of the Department of the California Highway Patrol to communicate with a vehicle equipped with the device.
(B)    The capability for electronic toll and traffic management on public or private roads or facilities.
(12)    A portable Global Positioning System (GPS), which may be mounted in a seven-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield farthest removed from the driver or in a five-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield nearest to the driver and outside of an airbag deployment zone, if the system is used only for door-to-door navigation while the motor vehicle is being operated.
(13)    (A)    A video event recorder with the capability of monitoring driver performance to improve driver safety, which may be mounted in a seven-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield farthest removed from the driver, in a five-inch square in the lower corner of the windshield nearest to the driver and outside of an airbag deployment zone, or in a five-inch square mounted to the center uppermost portion of the interior of the windshield. As used in this section, “video event recorder” means a video recorder that continuously records in a digital loop, recording audio, video, and G-force levels, but saves video only when triggered by an unusual motion or crash or when operated by the driver to monitor driver performance.
(B)    A vehicle equipped with a video event recorder shall have a notice posted in a visible location which states that a passenger’s conversation may be recorded.
(C)    Video event recorders shall store no more than 30 seconds before and after a triggering event.
(D)    The registered owner or lessee of the vehicle may disable the device.
(E)    The data recorded to the device is the property of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle.
(F)    When a person is driving for hire as an employee in a vehicle with a video event recorder, the person’s employer shall provide unedited copies of the recordings upon the request of the employee or the employee’s representative. These copies shall be provided free of charge to the employee and within five days of the request.
(14)    (A)    A video event recorder in a commercial motor vehicle with the capability of monitoring driver performance to improve driver safety, which may be mounted no more than two inches below the upper edge of the area swept by the windshield wipers, and outside the driver’s sight lines to the road and highway signs and signals. Subparagraphs (B) to (F), inclusive, of paragraph (13) apply to the exemption provided by this paragraph.
(B)    Except as provided in subparagraph (C), subparagraph (A) shall become inoperative on the following dates, whichever date is later:
(i)    The date that the Department of the California Highway Patrol determines is the expiration date of the exemption from the requirements of paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 393.60 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as renewed in the notice of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on pages 21791 and 21792 of Volume 76 of the Federal Register (April 18, 2011).
(ii)    The date that the Department of the California Highway Patrol determines is the expiration date for a subsequent renewal of an exemption specified in clause (i).
(C)    Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), subparagraph (A) shall become operative on the date that the Department of the California Highway Patrol determines is the effective date of regulations revising paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 393.60 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations to allow the placement of a video event recorder at the top of the windshield on a commercial motor vehicle.
(c)    Notwithstanding subdivision (a), transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the topmost portion of the windshield if the following conditions apply:
(1)    The bottom edge of the material is at least 29 inches above the undepressed driver’s seat when measured from a point five inches in front of the bottom of the backrest with the driver’s seat in its rearmost and lowermost position with the vehicle on a level surface.
(2)    The material is not red or amber in color.
(3)    There is no opaque lettering on the material and any other lettering does not affect primary colors or distort vision through the windshield.
(4)    The material does not reflect sunlight or headlight glare into the eyes of occupants of oncoming or following vehicles to any greater extent than the windshield without the material.
(d)    Notwithstanding subdivision (a), clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the front side windows, located to the immediate left and right of the front seat if the following conditions are met:
(1)    The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent.
(2)    The window glazing with the material applied meets all requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 C.F.R. 571.205), including the specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent and the abrasion resistance of AS–14 glazing, as specified in that federal standard.
(3)    The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the existing window glass to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays.
(4)    The driver has in his or her possession, or within the vehicle, a certificate signed by the installing company certifying that the windows with the material installed meet the requirements of this subdivision and the certificate identifies the installing company and the material’s manufacturer by full name and street address, or, if the material was installed by the vehicle owner, a certificate signed by the material’s manufacturer certifying that the windows with the material installed according to manufacturer’s instructions meet the requirements of this subdivision and the certificate identifies the material’s manufacturer by full name and street address.
(5)    If the material described in this subdivision tears or bubbles, or is otherwise worn to prohibit clear vision, it shall be removed or replaced.
(e)    Notwithstanding subdivision (a), clear, colorless, and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the windshield, side, or rear windows of a motor vehicle if the following conditions are met:
(1)    The material has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent.
(2)    The window glazing with the material applied meets all requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 C.F.R. 571.205), including the specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent and the abrasion resistance of AS–14 glazing, as specified in that federal standard.
(3)    The material is designed and manufactured to enhance the ability of the existing window glass to block the sun’s harmful ultraviolet A rays.
(4)    The driver has in his or her possession, or within the vehicle, a certificate signed by a licensed dermatologist certifying that the person should not be exposed to ultraviolet rays because of a medical condition that necessitates clear, colorless, and transparent film material to be installed on the windshield, side, or rear windows.
(5)    If the material described in this subdivision tears or bubbles, or is otherwise worn to prohibit clear vision, it shall be removed or replaced.
(Amended by Stats. 2017, AB 1303, Ch. 210, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2018.)

(Amended by Stats. 2012, AB 2477, Ch. 375, Sec. 2. Effective January 1, 2013.)

(Amended by Stats. 2010, AB 1942, Ch. 458, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2011.)

(Amended by Stats. 2009, AB 1164, Ch. 140, Sec. 181. Effective January 1, 2010.)

(Amended by Stats. 2008, SB 1567, Ch. 413, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2009.)

(Amended by Stats. 1998, Ch. 476, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 1999.)

[Big5er]

Chad,I just read that section and was about to post it also.  I'm anxious to see this exemption statute because we don't have one in Texas. Y'all DO have some strange laws over there though

[Chad Heiser]

2 minutes ago, Big5er said:

Chad,I just read that section and was about to post it also.  I'm anxious to see this exemption statute because we don't have one in Texas. Y'all DO have some strange laws over there though

I will agree California laws do not always make sense, which is why I try to keep an open mind on the codes.  The books are so thick with regulations and violations that there is no way to know or memorize them all.  There are also judicial guidelines that affect what judges do that do not directly apply to what we do on the street, which could be the case here.  This discussion has gotten me curious to see if there is something out there of which I was not aware.

[Alie&Jim's Carrilite]

Number 13 B is interesting.  Does that mean that I have to put a notice on the outside of the vehicle that our conversation and your actions may be recorded?  

[chirakawa]

34 minutes ago, Alie&Jim's Carrilite said:

Number 13 B is interesting.  Does that mean that I have to put a notice on the outside of the vehicle that our conversation and your actions may be recorded?  

Yes, if you're in California.  If you don't, Chad will give you a ticket and Twotoes will dismiss it.

[Chad Heiser]

42 minutes ago, chirakawa said:

Yes, if you're in California.  If you don't, Chad will give you a ticket and Twotoes will dismiss it.

Only if you drive through my city.  

 

[Big5er]

2 hours ago, Chad Heiser said:

Only if you drive through my city.  

Oh come on , Chad. Can't you just pretend that Jim drove through your city and mail him a ticket?

[Chad Heiser]

3 minutes ago, Big5er said:

Oh come on , Chad. Can't you just pretend that Jim drove through your city and mail him a ticket?

I like Jim, so he would probably get a break from me. 

 

[Alie&Jim's Carrilite]

9 minutes ago, Big5er said:

Oh come on , Chad. Can't you just pretend that Jim drove through your city and mail him a ticket?

Be nice or you won't get dinner next month.....

6 minutes ago, Chad Heiser said:

I like Jim, so he would probably get a break from me. 

 

Or is it the Apple Pie moonshine you like?

 

[Twotoes]

Dam Big5er I’m retired. Now your going to make me do legal research. Who do I bill for my time lol lol lol. It’s just like the law in CA requires a front license plate but some states do not and you can’t be cited for not having a front plate while driving thru CA if you are registered in a state that does not require a front plate. To require some one driving thru CA to remove tinting that is legal in their home state is unrealistic since it is permanent and costly to the owner of the vehicle. Now if they want to register their vehicle in CA they will have to make the vehicle comply with all CA laws including smog laws. 

[Twotoes]

Another example is CA smog laws. A person driving a vehicle registered in another state and passing thru CA does not have to modify their exhaust system. The same is true for a motorcycle exhaust. A person riding a motorcycle thru CA that has a legal exhaust in their home state does not have to modify the motorcycle exhaust to comply with CA law, as long as they are just passing thru. I could go on but I think that I have made my point. Now TX law may be different. I only go by CA law. 

[Lance A Lott]

A 1 and b3 would seem to make my inspection sticker a violation.

[AquaDawg]

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/31301

"(2) “commerce” means trade, traffic, and transportation—"

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/statecommerce.htm

"So. Pacific Co. v Arizona (1945) demonstrates that state laws might violate the Commerce Clause even when in-state and out-of-state commerce are treated equally.  The case involved a challenge to Arizona's law prohibiting trains from crossing the state that contained more than 70 freight cars.  Southern Pacific complained that the law required them to choose between disassembling at the Arizona border larger trains, making two runs across the state, and then reassembling the trains or avoiding Arizona altogether.  Arizona argued the law was a safety measure designed to minimize the risk of "slack action" accidents to which longer trains are susceptible.  The Court applied a test that balanced the state's safety interest against what it saw as the very substantial burden the law imposed on interstate commerce.  The law was struck down.  The same test was used in 1959 to strike down an Illinois law requiring trucks to have contoured rear fender mudguards rather than the straight mud guard flaps required by most other states (Bibb v Navajo Freight) and in 1978 to invalidate a Wisconsin law that limited truck length to 55 feet at a time when most long haul truck lines had gone to 65 foot trucks (Raymond Motor Transportation v Rice)."


Because of the Interstate Commerce clause of the constitution, states are required to allow a vehicle that is legal in it's home state, to travel freely through that state. Nothing in the clause says it applies to commercial vehicles only.

 

[Big5er]

10 hours ago, Twotoes said:

It’s just like the law in CA requires a front license plate but some states do not and you can’t be cited for not having a front plate while driving thru CA if you are registered in a state that does not require a front plate.

A license plate falls under registration and as we already stated, registration is reciprocal.

AquaDawg, using the interstate commerce clause seems to be pushing it a bit. None of the cases you referenced had anything to do with passenger vehicles, rather trains and commercial transportation. Some things to read and consider.

Quote

 

In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court ruled Congress was exercising its Commerce Clause power to regulate local economic activity in ways that the States were powerless to regulate, because only the federal government could effectively control the national wheat supply. The Court reasoned that if Wickard could be applied to acts of gun violence, simply because crime impaired education, Congress might conclude that crime in schools substantially affects commerce, and may be regulated. Under this logic, all police power could be nationalized and local police and criminal courts eliminated on the theory that all crime affects commerce.

As the majority explained:

Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.

The opinion pointed out that prior decisions had identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.

• First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce;^[17]
• Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in Interstate Commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;^[18]
• Finally, Congress's commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce (i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce).^[19]

Thus the federal government did not have the power to regulate relatively unrelated things such as the possession of firearms near schools, as in Lopez. This was the first time in sixty years, since the conflict with President Roosevelt in 1936–37, that the Court had overturned a putative regulation on interstate commerce because it exceeded Congress's commerce power. Justice Clarence Thomas, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that allowing Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause would confer on Congress a general "police power" over the entire nation.

During the Rehnquist court and to present, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution has played an integral part in the Court's view of the Commerce Clause. The Tenth Amendment states that the federal government has only the powers specifically delegated to it by the Constitution while other powers are reserved to the states, or to the people. The Commerce Clause is an important source of those powers delegated to Congress, and therefore its interpretation is very important in determining the scope of federal power in controlling innumerable aspects of American life.

 

That would seem to mean that the Supreme court is saying that traffic enforcement and traffic laws not pertaining to commercial activity do NOT fall under the Commerce Clause since traffic laws are, as we know, STATE law and not Federal law. That is why there is no FEDERAL agency tasked with traffic enforcement (except on Federal Land) because they are not violations that are governed by Federal law and that is also why it is necessary to have  specific laws and reciprocity agreements in place covering vehicle registration and drivers licenses. 

Twotoes, I'm still with Chad on this. Just like the section Chad quoted, the law says it is illegal to operate ANY vehicle, not just ones registered in the state they happen to get stopped in. Texas has a law making it illegal to have a "flashing, beacon or alternating light of red, white or blue in color" other than turn signals, stop lamps and hazard warning lamps (defined as the vehicle 4way emergency flashers). Some states have no law governing blue lights. Are you saying, that simply because a vehicle is registered in oh say Arkansas (example only) where that would be legal, that he can not be issued a citation for having flashing blue lights in Texas? And that as a  Texas LEO, I must determine whether his home state allows blue lights, effectively requiring me to not only know the laws of my own state but the traffic laws of every other state (tint, blue lights, allowed tire tread depth, height of mud flaps, number of required lights, etc, etc, etc, etc ad nauseum)? Does this even make sense?

Does this way of thinking apply only to "equipment" violations? What about other laws? If it is legal to hold and talk on your cell phone while driving in your home state can you do that in states where it is prohibited? "But Officer, I didn't know. In my state it is legal". "Oh well in that case, you can go".  

I have never seen anything in the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Transportation Code or the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that says that any one or any vehicle from out of state is exempt from our State Laws (other than the previously mentioned registration and drivers licensing). As a matter of fact. it is SPECIFICALLY listed in both sections for registration (Sec. 502.145) and DL requirements (Sec. 521.030) that as long as the vehicle is registered in or the person has a DL from their state of residence then they are exempt from having to be registered or licensed in Texas. Nowhere in any other section do you find vehicles exempted because they are from out of state and I would be terribly surprised to find that in the laws of any State. After all, if what you say is true, wouldn't there be some mention of it in the law? An entire section on reciprocity or exemptions, rather than a single, very limited, mention in only 2 sections?  

Judges can do whatever they want, legal or otherwise, in their courtroom but until I see it in writing I think we will just have to agree to disagree.

Safe travels to you sir, and thank you for your service. 

[Twotoes]

A flashing light is different. It can be turned off. Whereas, window tint must be physically and permanently removed at a cost to the owner. And an additional cost to reapply when the owner gets back to their home state. This is what we in the law call unconscionable and unenforceable. 

Another example is lane splitting for motorcycles. Most states like AZ, CO, NV have laws prohibiting lane splitting. There is no law in CA prohibiting splitting. Therefor, even tho there is no statute allowing it, it is legal because there is now law prohibiting it.